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Cognition and recognition 
 




Abstract While concurring with Honneth’s reconstruction of reification as a 
form of forgetfulness, this article questions the way in which he arrives at that 
conclusion as well as the conceptual status he ascribes to recognition – the instance 
with reference to which reification is exhibited as distortion or deformation. It argues, 
first, that Honneth’s dualistic mode of argumentation falls behind the left-Hegelian 
tradition which he himself seeks to revitalize, thus causing a serious architectonic 
problem; and, secondly, that while polemicizing strongly against the cognitive 
approach, he at crucial points actually reverts to the very resources made available by 
that mode of thinking. Being the central concern of the article, this latter aspect is 
treated as the cognitive problem in his work, especially in his Tanner Lectures. 
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Introduction 
A characteristic feature of Axel Honneth’s work is a consistently expressed critical 
attitude towards the cognitive approach. Although always negatively referred to, it is 
obviously an important device of which he makes regular use. Throughout his 
writings, he employs it as a contrasting foil against which to characterize and give 
profile to his own unique position. While his work covering a number of decades is 
replete with references to it, his recent Berkeley Tanner Lectures (Honneth 2008) on 
reification contain an exemplary systematic treatment to which is central the relation 
between cognition and recognition – the latter of which, as is well known, serves as 
Honneth’s philosophical signature. As such, the Lectures provide a less textually 
disparate, more coherent and thus convenient source for an analysis and critical 
assessment of his understanding of the cognitive dimension and its significance or 
lack thereof. 
In the following paragraphs, I propose to undertake just such an analysis and 
critical assessment in two parts. The first part briefly documents Honneth’s 
conception of the cognitive and equally briefly then shows how he employs it to 
stylize and give profile to his recognition-theoretical position. In the second part, I 
point out and elaborate at some more length on two concomitant problems which arise 
in the course of the development of his position. The upshot of the account is that 
Honneth not only operates with a rather narrow, traditional conception of the 
cognitive, but that he at crucial junctures in fact falls back on assumptions which are 
close to and even derive from the contemporary stage in the development of the very 
approach he repudiates. The source of the problem is not just his partial 
misunderstanding of the cognitive problematic, but also his mode of argumentation 
which, giving rise to a serious architectonic or conceptual problem, falls short of the 
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resources available in the left-Hegelian tradition of which he himself is a 
representative. 
In pursuing this line of argumentation, needless to say, it is not possible to 
follow in detail and to do justice to the intricacies of Honneth’s admirably clear 
argumentation aimed at restoring Lukács’ concept of reification in a new idiom. The 
particular and thus limited focus of this article is on the architectonic structure of his 
highly commendable effort to make reification available once more as a key concept 
of contemporary critical theory. Special emphasis within this structure is reserved for 
the place he affords the cognitive dimension.1 It should be made clear at the outset 
that the argument presented here does not affect Honneth’s interpretation of 
reification as forgetfulness. What it does intend to do is to question both the way he 




Honneth’s conception and use of the cognitive 
 
The cognitive 
Honneth understands the cognitivist approach of which he is so critical in terms of the 
particular model and hence orientation which it adopts, according to him, due to its 
assumption of and even fixation on the ‘subject-object schema’ (30, 33, 36).2 
Following this figure of thought, the subject is a ‘cognitive subject’ (30) who places 
itself in opposition to reality which its treats as an object, as its ‘objective 
circumstances’ (33). This requires of it to take up an ‘intellectual…objectifying 
relation to the world’ (38, 40) which it accomplishes through engagement in 
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‘cognitive acts’ (46, 50) of various kinds. They stretch from ‘perception’ (58), 
through the adoption of an ‘observer perspective’ (34) or ‘spectator model’ (37) 
enabling a ‘detached…neutral encounter’ (48, 30, 32, 38) with reality, to 
‘conceptual…objectifying thought’ (57, 54) which spearheads a ‘process of 
abstraction’ (38, 42). These acts eventuate in ‘propositions’ (37) or ‘statements’ (48) 
which represent ‘cognitive knowledge’ (49) or ‘rational knowledge’ (37) making 
possible a ‘rational understanding of the world’ (36). What starts as a merely 
objectifying relation to the world is thus transformed in the process into an ‘epistemic 
relation to the world’ (47) crowned by ‘certain knowledge’ (49). The ‘cognitive 
subject’ can thus be equated with the ‘epistemic subject’ (30, 48) as well as 
‘cognition’ with ‘knowledge’ (48).  
While this overview of associations and relations, despite its brevity, raises a 
series of questions that will have to be attended to, let us for the moment just make a 
general observation. It may be that some versions of the cognitive approach fit 
Honneth’s characterization, yet the question is whether such versions can be taken as 
definitively defining of it. From the overview it is apparent that Honneth tends to 
follow a certain relatively widespread predisposition among social scientists and 
philosophers to conceive of the cognitive in a traditional way which equates it with 
the intellectual and the epistemic and sees it as being defined by objective, rational or 
certain knowledge. As against this tendency, however, it should be pointed out that 
since the cognitive revolution of the late 1950s the cognitive is more adequately 
understood not as simply coinciding with knowledge or ‘know that’, but rather as 
covering more fundamentally also capacities and competences or ‘know how’. The 
latter capacities and competences indeed include ones which make possible the 
generation of knowledge, but they by no means admit of being confined just to the 
 4 
Published in Philosophy and Social Criticism 38(6), 2012, pp. 591-607. 
 
intellect. The cognitive subject, therefore, entails much more than the merely 
epistemic subject, as Honneth conceives it, and hence cognition cannot summarily be 
reduced to knowledge. 
Before proceeding with the pursuit of these and other questions, let us first see 
how Honneth employs the cognitive, as he conceives it, in the development of his 
own characteristic position.  
 
The relation of cognition and recognition 
Honneth’s characterization of the cognitive dimension essentially serves as a foil 
against which to present and give profile to his own particular position centred on the 
concept of recognition. For the most part, therefore, cognition and recognition appear 
as polar opposites in the course of his argument. Whereas a negative key is reserved 
for the former, the latter is sounded in a positive one. If the cognitive can be identified 
by reference to such characteristics as intellectual cognitive acts which proceed by 
way of detached, disinterested, neutral conceptualization and abstraction aimed at 
objectifying reality for the purpose of gaining certain knowledge about it, then 
recognition has to be conceived as exhibiting diametrically opposed features. To be 
fair to Honneth’s argument, he does take pains to forestall misconstruing cognition 
and recognition as starkly opposed. For this purpose, he (28, 29, 54-5) engages on 
more than one occasion in criticism of Lukács’ unjustifiable tendency to regard all 
forms of objectification without exception as nothing less than instances of reification. 
In various domains of modern social life, activities are required for the reproduction 
of society which are indeed characterized by detachment, disinterestedness, neutrality, 
observation, contemplation, objectification and so forth but which, to be sure, can by 
no means without distinction be branded as reified practices or as being regulated by 
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reified ideas. It is apparent throughout the Tanner Lectures, nevertheless, that the 
contrast between the negatively presented cognitive approach and his own 
recognition-theoretical position is the principal figure of thought Honneth uses to give 
structure to his argument. As will be demonstrated in due course, it is this mode of 
procedure that not only leaves a trace of dualistic conceptualization in the Tanner 
Lectures, but in fact causes also a severe architectonic disjunction in Honneth’s 
thinking. The latter most remarkably exhibits insecurity in his relation and 
appropriation of a central aspect of the left-Hegelian tradition which he himself has 
been seeking to revive for some time now (e.g. Honneth 2007a, 2003). Before 
elaborating on this and other related matters, however, it is necessary to textually 
support the claim regarding Honneth’s use of the device of contrasting cognition and 
recognition. 
In developing the contrast in question, Honneth starts from three philosophers 
who represent vastly divergent traditions yet nevertheless converge in their thinking – 
at least, judging by their concepts which are of key relevance in this context: Georg 
Lukács’ Hegelian-Marxist concept of ‘true or genuine human praxis’ (26) or 
‘empathetic engagement’ (35); Martin Heidegger’s existential hermeneutic-
phenomenological concept of ‘care’ (30); and John Dewey’s pragmatist concept of 
‘human beings’ primordial relation to the world’ (36). The common assumption 
underpinning all three these concepts is that of a ‘practical human relation to the 
world’ (26) which Honneth plays off against the ‘merely cognitive stance to their 
surroundings’ (58) or ‘epistemic relation to the world’ (47). While this cognitive or 
epistemic relation is characterized by a ‘detached…neutral…contemplative mode of 
practices and attitudes’ (48, 30, 29), Honneth goes to all sorts of lengths to bring out 
and stress the exactly contrary features of the contrasting practical relation. The latter 
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is realized through ‘proper…genuine… true human praxis’ (26, 27) in which the 
agents take up a ‘non-epistemic…empathetic and engaged relationship’ (57, 27) with 
the world, including their social and natural surroundings and themselves. ‘Empathy’ 
(27, 29, 50) or ‘sympathy’ (49) and ‘engagement’ (27, 29, 50) with the world infused 
with such ‘feeling’ (36) and ‘emotion’ (42, 48, 50, 58), all absent from the cognitive 
approach in Honneth’s judgement, are of central importance to his nuanced core 
argument. Far from registering disinterest as in the case of the ‘observer’ (34) who, 
along cognitive-epistemic lines, is oriented towards ‘objectifying’ (49, 54) reality for 
the purposes of arriving at a ‘statement…[of]... propositional…[and hence]…certain 
knowledge’ (37, 47, 48), the contrasting process of ‘emotionally saturated practical 
dealings with the world’ (37) exhibits its own unique qualities. Among them are the 
‘interestedness’ (27, 30) of the ‘participant’ (34) who relates to the world in an 
‘affective’ (45) mode and is therefore able to maintain an attitude of ‘openness’ (45) 
and ‘receptiveness’ (44) towards others and the natural surroundings, including 
occurrences of all kinds, as well as the self. 
Honneth finally sharpens the basic contrast he so meticulously built up by not 
just drawing a distinction between the ‘cognitivist model of social interaction’ – 
which, by the way, is represented by Habermas among others – and the ‘model of 
reciprocal affectedness’ (49), but actually by replacing the former by the latter. More 
significantly still, he argues at some length in favour of the priority of the 
‘recognitional stance’ over the cognitive stance, indeed, over ‘all other attitudes 
toward the self and the world’ (36). With the assistance of authors covering the 
developmental psychological ground like Peter Hobson and Michael Tomasello, he is 
convinced that it is possible to demonstrate the temporal or ontogenetic priority of 
recognition over cognition, and by appeal to Stanley Cavell’s philosophical theory of 
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intersubjectivity he maintains that the conceptual or categorical priority of recognition 
can be established as well. The priority Honneth ascribes to recognition or the 
‘recognitional stance’ (38), as he calls it, becomes intelligible once one considers that 
he understands by it a primordial, existential, embodied mode of relation to the world 
which is realized through the constantly active assessment of the value which persons, 
the self and the physical surroundings, including animals, plants and things possess in 
themselves. It is in this vein that he is willing to claim on numerous occasions that the 
priority enjoyed by this mode of relation can and must be taken in the sense of being 
the ‘basis’ or ‘origin’ (35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 46, 57). As regards this claim, he admits in a 
self-critical moment that it is a form of recognition which is more elementary not just 
than cognition, but even the kind of recognition he had identified before: ‘I now 
assume that this ‘existential’ mode of recognition provides a foundation for all other, 
more substantial forms of recognition…’ (90). 
The scene is now set for a more penetrating analysis and critical assessment of 
Honneth’s understanding of the cognitive dimension and the conceptual framework 
within which he incorporates it. 
  
 
From the architectonic to the cognitive problem 
 
Tension between the dualistic and tripartite models 
The first thing that strikes one on studying Honneth’s Tanner Lectures is the dualistic 
mode of thinking which runs like a red line through it from beginning to end. He 
indeed intermittently attempts to mitigate it, for instance, by denying a relation of 
opposition between cognition and recognition in favour of declaring the latter as the 
 8 
Published in Philosophy and Social Criticism 38(6), 2012, pp. 591-607. 
 
condition of possibility of the former (54); or by criticizing Lukács’ equation of 
reification and objectification (28, 29, 54-5). Considering that this untenable equation 
inevitably results from Lukács’ idealistic productivist paradigm according to which all 
objectivity can be traced back to the activity of a world-constituting subject, Honneth 
instead appeals to an alternative interactionist or intersubjectivist theoretical 
framework. Despite these efforts, however, dualistic thinking effectively continues to 
structure the principal argument of the Lectures. Although avowedly adopting the 
alternative paradigm, there is ample evidence that he fails to follow it through 
consistently to the end. Had he actually done so, he would have freed himself from 
the fetters of dualistic thinking, yet all indications are that it persists and 
predominates. In accordance with it, the relation between cognition and recognition is 
presented as one of asymmetrical dependency. Cognition appears as the figure and 
recognition as the ground. The former is derivative, while the function of origin, basis 
and foundation is ascribed to the latter. This position, which is clearly the product of 
conceiving the relation between cognition and recognition in dualistic terms, gives 
rise to the unfortunate impression of a new version of foundationalism or philosophy 
of origins. This impression leads to a serious question regarding the cogency of 
Honneth’s argument. 
On closer inspection, it becomes apparent that neither the ontogenetic priority 
of recognition as plausibly established by developmental psychology warrants a claim 
to a new foundationalism, nor does the conceptual or categorical status of existential 
involvement in reality. It is evident particularly from the latter that the dualistic mode 
of thinking leads Honneth astray. This is the case since the clarification of the sense of 
the conceptual or categorical status of existential involvement in reality requires a 
more differentiated and complex mode of thinking than the two-dimensional figure 
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and ground or edifice and foundation schema effectively underpinning Honneth’s 
argument. It is at this stage of the investigation that a remarkable finding asserts itself. 
Present in the Tanner Lectures are in fact two distinct figures of thought or models – 
the predominant dualistic model and another more adequate one which becomes 
momentarily visible from time to time, but is not allowed sufficient sway to shape the 
argument. What is even more remarkable is that this more differentiated and complex 
model is to be found in a number of the authors Honneth discusses in detail, namely 
Lukács, Adorno and in particular Dewey. Considering these three names, it means 
that the model in question, the one able to dissipate the spectre of dualistic thinking 
and foundationalism, is characteristic of the left-Hegelian tradition, since not just 
critical theory but also pragmatism is an heir to this heritage.3
A closer look at the Tanner Lectures brings to the fore Honneth’s oscillation 
between the two options and, thereby, also the nature of the more adequate model. 
This model becomes unmistakably apparent beyond the dualistic one for the first time 
when he turns his attention to Dewey. As in the case of Lukács, Honneth selectively 
appropriates Dewey’s ideas from the point of view of establishing his concept of 
recognition. What he seeks to accomplish is to make a connection between Dewey’s 
conception of the human practical relation to the world as a relation laden with 
qualitative experience and his own concept of recognition. As a pragmatist in the 
tradition founded by Peirce and as a former Hegelian, Dewey writes in a manner that 
exhibits the logical structure of his thinking more readily than is the case with Lukács. 
It is this feature of Dewey’s work that leads Honneth to offer an analysis which, 
although falling back into a dualistic presentation, allows momentary glimpses to be 
caught of the more adequate model. 
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At the very outset of his discussion of Dewey, Honneth gives a one-sentence 
summary of the core of the American philosopher’s position: ‘Dewey’s reflections 
boil down to the assertion that every rational understanding of the world is always 
already bound up with a holistic form of experience, in which all elements of a given 
situation are qualitatively disclosed from a perspective of engaged involvement’ (36). 
From this the conclusion then follows for Honneth that Dewey’s highlighting of the 
role of qualitatively significant, engaged involvement allows the demonstration of 
‘the primacy of this kind of recognition over all merely cognitive attitudes toward the 
world’ (36). The discrepancy between these two positions jumps off the page, as it 
were – at least, for anyone who is familiar with pragmatism from Peirce and Royce, 
through Dewey and C Wright Mills, to Bernstein and Brandom. It would be even 
more obvious to anyone who is familiar with the close relation between critical theory 
and pragmatism – a relation, nowhere adequately attended to by Honneth, which has 
been moving closer and closer to the centre of attention since Karl-Otto Apel’s (1995) 
groundbreaking Peirce studies of 1967 and 1970 and his (Apel 1974, 1980) and 
Habermas’ (1992, 1996, 2003) acknowledgement of the logic or structure of thinking 
commonly shared by the two seemingly very different traditions. In summarizing 
Dewey’s position, Honneth actually offers a statement of this common core which 
represents nothing less that the alternative, more complex model at issue here. By 
contrast with two-place dualistic thinking, it is the three-place sign-mediated or 
semiotic process model which, as Apel (1974) pointed out, was in nuce present in the 
early Marx but worked out in detail by Peirce, and later continued to play a basic 
structuring role, even if in a subterranean manner, in both pragmatism and critical 
theory, including Dewey in the former tradition and Lukács4 and Adorno5 in the latter. 
Captured in terms of Peircean logic, the tripartite sign relation – a sign (1) signifies or 
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refers to something (2) for an interpreter (3) – entails that three kinds of signs – icons, 
indices and symbols – have a role in all processes of meaning creation and knowledge 
production and application, which thereby bring into play three mutually implicated 
yet analytically distinct dimensions of reality – felt quality or ‘firstness’, confrontation 
with and reaction to an object or ‘secondness’ and, finally, interpretation, 
understanding, concept, theory, knowledge, agreement, confirmation of reality or 
‘thirdness’ (Peirce 1960: paragraph 5.6; Apel 1980; Habermas 1992). That Honneth’s 
position represents nothing less than a dualistic reduction of the more complex model 
Dewey operates with is apparent from the fact that his summary of Dewey’s position 
reflects, contrary to his own conclusion, precisely this threefold Peircean logic: every 
rational understanding of the world (thirdness) is always already bound up with a 
holistic form of experience (the semiotic process of sign-mediated meaning creation 
and knowledge production and application which forms part of the world) in which all 
elements of a given situation (secondness) are qualitatively disclosed from a 
perspective of engaged involvement (firstness). 
As suggested above, Honneth interprets Dewey’s position as though it 
involves two distinct levels. First, there is a primary level of involved engagement 
with the world which is infused with qualitative experience. It is this level that 
Honneth takes to correspond to the kind of recognition he has in mind and to which he 
ascribes ‘primacy’ (36). Secondly, there is the derivative level of so-called ‘merely 
cognitive attitudes toward the world’ (36) where agents process actual situations and 
analyse their components ‘secondarily’ (37). Honneth develops this particular 
interpretation by, on the one hand, noting Dewey’s criticism of the predominant 
‘spectator model’ based on the traditional subject-object opposition and the pernicious 
consequences its acceptance has for the organization of society and, on the other, 
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stressing Dewey’s corrective strategy of demonstrating that ‘our emotionally saturated 
practical dealings with the world provide the basis of all rational knowledge’ (37). 
Honneth follows this interpretation up by once again summarizing Dewey’s position 
in a manner which purportedly supports his conclusion: According to Dewey, ‘…all 
existential propositions have their cognitive roots in situations that “despite their 
internal complexity for the acting subject are thoroughly dominated and characterised 
by a single quality”’ (37). Instead of bearing out his interpretation, however, this 
summary actually provides yet a second glimpse of the tripartite model outlined above 
with reference to Peirce. According to the same logic, all existential propositions 
(thirdness) have their cognitive roots in situations (secondness) that “despite their 
internal complexity for the acting subject are thoroughly dominated and characterised 
by a single quality (firstness). The contrasting perspective that this more complex 
model thus provides once again shows up Honneth’s interpretation as a reductive one 
and, furthermore, suggests that the source of his tendency toward foundationalism 
must be sought in this indefensible step. 
It is Honneth’s conceptual strategy that drives him in the direction of 
foundationalism. The dualistic argumentation makes him, first, focus on Dewey’s 
attempt to restore an appreciation for the emotionally significant quality of reality felt 
when it impinges upon or announces itself to human beings in the form of a problem, 
a person, an event, an occurrence, or a physical phenomenon. Secondly, it leads him 
to fix on this qualitative aspect as the supposed ‘origin’ (35, 39, 57), ‘basis’ (37, 40), 
‘antecedent’ (38, 40, 47, 50) or even ‘foundation’ (90) of all else that follows. The 
error of extrapolating such a foundation from the all-pervasive quality of some aspect 
of reality as human beings are called upon by it, tune in to it, have a feeling about it or 
develop a mood about it, becomes graphically clear as soon as one relates it to the 
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tripartite process model. So far from being a foundation, the felt quality of reality, or 
what Peirce called ‘firstness’, is but one of three moments in the process of meaning 
creation, knowledge development and application. Honneth is quite correct in 
emphasising with Dewey that this moment should never be ‘allowed simply to vanish’ 
or to be ‘forgotten’ (38). In this sense, one can agree with his understanding of 
reification as involving ‘forgetfulness’ (52), but decidedly not with any tendency to 
transpose it into some sort of foundation. In so far as the singular, iconically signified 
and humanly felt quality of reality is a moment in a process which is constantly 
involved in mutually implicative relations with the remaining two moments, that is, 
existential confrontation with and reaction to an object or ‘secondness’ and 
conceptualization, theorization, argumentation and agreement about reality or 
‘thirdness’, it is always and everywhere present, yet not in a foundational sense.6 In 
fact, freezing the process by basing it on one of its moments understood as a 
foundation may well be tantamount, ironically, to creating an unwanted source of 
reification itself.7  
Besides the two occasions discussed thus far on which Honneth inadvertently 
allows the more complex model to surface, there is evidence in the text of his Tanner 
Lectures of another comparable case8 as well as of at least two other revealing 
instances of short-circuiting of his own typical dualistic model and the more adequate 
tripartite model. In an outline of Dewey’s methodology, Honneth (38-40) effectively 
shows that the pattern involves three interrelated moments. Infused with fear, concern 
and hope, an emotion-laden perception of the quality of a situation (firstness) opens 
the way and indicates the direction in which an analysis of the components of the 
situation (secondness) representing the object of knowledge could go in order to make 
possible the intellectual handling of the problem at issue, thus potentially fulfilling the 
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anticipated goal of the whole exercise (thirdness) – for instance, solving the problem 
which in the first instance gave rise to fear, concern and hope. In keeping with his 
predilection to primordialize the first qualitative moment, however, Honneth does not 
observe the mutual implication of the three moments in the process of meaning 
creation and knowledge production and application, but instead plays the first and 
second moments off against one another and, as a result, underplays the third moment 
captured by such concepts as ‘reason’, ‘goal’ and ‘direction’ (39). At this juncture it 
should be pointed out that what is most remarkable is that, by contrast with this 
dualistic reduction, Honneth’s own understanding of critical theory’s methodology 
presented elsewhere9 matches more or less the tripartite model which is typical of the 
left-Hegelian tradition represented by both critical theory and pragmatism. One thing 
that is conspicuously missing from his accounts here and elsewhere, however, is the 
mode of inference of abduction over and above induction and deduction. Its inclusion, 
which is mandatory in any adequate account of methodology, would have forestalled 
the reductive tendency exhibited by his Tanner Lectures. Abduction, which is 
discussed by Peirce (1960), Apel (1995) and Habermas (1992) and finds graphic 
expression in C Wright Mills’ famous concept of the ‘sociological imagination’ 
(1970),10 is a mode of inference that starts precisely from the initial moment of the 
vague sense or feeling of the unique quality of a particular situation, but at the same 
time centrally involves also the forging of relations among the three moments which 
are then maintained throughout the process. In doing so, it brings fears, concerns and 
hopes into play which in turn activate, on the one hand, the concerned taking 
responsibility for the matter at issue and, on the other, the imaginative opening up of 
the situation, its components, the nature of the matter at issue in it, the kind of 
knowledge and action called for to deal adequately with the matter, and the desired 
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appropriate outcome.11 The disjunction between Honneth’s reconstruction of Dewey’s 
methodology and his own left-Hegelian understanding elsewhere mirrors the 
architectonic problem plaguing his Tanner Lectures. 
There are two further illuminating examples of the jarring of the dualistic and 
tripartite models in the Lectures which are worth reviewing briefly. On one occasion 
where he refers to Cavell and Sartre sharing a model of reciprocal affectedness which 
both label recognition, Honneth does not dualistically play the first moment off 
against the second one, but instead collapses the latter upon the former. He writes: 
‘Indeed, subjects are generally certain of having another subject with mental 
properties before them, since they are touched by this second subject’s emotional 
states in such a way that they see themselves compelled to react in a certain way’ 
(49). Here he incorporates the certainty involved in being confronted by an object and 
reacting to it, which belongs to the second objective situational moment, in the first 
moment of sensing and feeling the quality of a new situation which is just arising. In 
opposition to his usual dualistic contrasting strategy, he here begins to acknowledge 
the mutual implication of the two distinct moments, yet in his pervasive reductive 
mood of locating a primordial stratum nevertheless assimilates the second to the first.  
On another occasion, Honneth seeks to counter the questionable implication of 
a position he had assumed earlier, which seemed to suggest that he regards 
recognition or empathetic engagement in principle as a positive orientation, by 
agreeing with Cavell that even indifferent and negative feelings are forms of 
intersubjective acknowledgement. In this context, Honneth then finds it necessary 
nevertheless to qualify Cavell’s position by submitting that, in a situation of a 
negative emotional response to others, ‘we still always have a residual intuitive sense 
of not having done full justice to their personalities. In such a situation, the element of 
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our recognitional stance which we customarily call “conscience” would be at issue’ 
(51). That Honneth then goes on to assert that this shows that the recognitional stance 
is ‘a wholly elementary form [which] does not yet imply the perception of the specific 
value of another person’ (51), blatantly contradicts the fact that here the mutual 
implication of different moments are at play. So far from coinciding with the first 
moment of emotional affectedness, conscience is a social-cognitive phenomenon 
which presupposes general knowledge of the Other and of the moral rules applying to 
relations with the Other. As such, it indeed does not coincide with the second moment 
of the perception of the specific value of a particular person in a particular situation 
either, but rather belongs to the third moment of situation-transcendent ideas or 
principles which symbolically structure or regulatively generate both the second and 
first moments. 
Both these examples of the inadvertent short-circuiting of the moments of the 
tripartite model instead of an appreciation of their mutual implication, confirm the 
principal argument pursued thus far in the present section. The aim of this argument 
was to reveal the architectonic problem running right through Honneth’s Tanner 
Lectures which is indicated, despite the dualistic conceptual strategy covering it over 
for the most part, by his oscillation between two distinct figures of thought or models. 
Rather than leaving this argument stand on its own, however, it is important to me in 
terms of my own particular approach to the revitalization of critical theory to take it 
one step further. In my view, there is an inherent connection between the architectonic 
problem exhibited by Honneth’s Tanner Lectures and his consistent attempt to demote 
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Re-cognition as cognitive concept 
As pointed out at the outset, the cognitive dimension is one that Honneth has been 
attending to throughout his work over some two decades. While the pattern for 
dealing with it was tentatively set in an early work and in his habilitation thesis, 
Honneth gave it the social-theoretically relevant form it retains in the Tanner Lectures 
in his inaugural address at the Free University of Berlin in 1993. In the early work, it 
was considered in relation to a questioning of Klaus Holzkamp’s critical psychology 
which proceeded from the unacceptable reduction of perception to its purely 
instrumental function. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of empiricist and 
rationalist theories of perception and concomitant rejection of the Cartesian 
ontological dualism in favour of regarding body and mind as fused in the perceptual 
act, Honneth and his collaborator concluded that ‘perception has an essential primacy’ 
and hence that ‘the human body is itself a medium of cognitive acts’ (Honneth and 
Joas 1988: 115, 116). 
In his habilitation thesis, Honneth (1992) discusses the cognitive in the context 
of an analysis of George Herbert Mead’s contribution. What attracts the attention of 
the reader is Honneth’s employment of a number of distinctions directly or indirectly 
deriving from Hegel, Mead and Habermas in order to make sense of Mead’s theory of 
the formation of identity or the self. Among them are the conceptual pairs 
practical/epistemic, cognitive/moral or normative, and cognitive/practical (1992: 122-
23). In turn, these distinctions are applied to different domains. So, for example, 
Honneth speaks of a practical in distinction to an epistemic ‘relation to the self’; of a 
‘self-image’ which contains only ‘cognitive behavioural demands’ as against a self-
image incorporating ‘normative behavioural attitudes’; of a configuration of self, 
Mead’s ‘me’, which embraces both a ‘neutral instance of cognitive problem solving’ 
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and a ‘moral instance of intersubjective conflict resolution’. A question arises here as 
to how these different distinction relate to one another or, more specifically, whether 
it is possible at all to make them align. In fact, the impression of inconsistency and 
incoherence grows stronger as the reading progresses. The distinction between the 
practical and the epistemic is presented as though it is equivalent to that of the 
normative and the cognitive. But then the practical is conceived very differently as the 
combination or integration of the cognitive (problem solving instance) and the 
normative (conflict resolution instance). The cognitive, for its part, seems to be 
presented as being equivalent to the epistemic, both of these meaning something like 
the conscious having of knowledge, both relating to the intelligence and theoretical-
empirical knowledge relevant to problem solving. But then there is the availability of 
cognitivist moral theories which suggests that the cognitive can by no means be 
confined the intelligence, theoretical-empirical knowledge and problem solving. On 
the contrary, it equally concerns conscience which relates to moral-practical 
knowledge relevant to intersubjective relations and interpersonal conflict resolution. 
This means that if the cognitive is to do with both problem-solving and conflict-
resolution competences, the latter of which is acquired through socialisation or a 
moral-practical learning process in a particular form of life and the former of which is 
refined through a theoretical-empirical learning process, then it is much closer to the 
practical than Honneth’s distinction between them would lead one to believe. Indeed, 
this is the sense that the cognitive has been acquiring in the course of the development 
which has been inaugurated by the cognitive revolution of the late 1950s.12 There is 
evidence that the resulting narrow, traditional concept of the cognitive as well as the 
inconsistent and incoherent conceptualization surrounding it in the habilitation thesis 
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gets reproduced to some degree in Honneth’s later work such as the inaugural address 
and the Tanner Lectures. 
Against the background of a concern with the cognitive dimension in the 
context of philosophical anthropological, ontological and epistemological 
considerations in the earlier writings, Honneth (2007a) shifted in his inaugural address 
to a social theoretical context – one defined by critical theory. Here he specifies the 
problem that needs to be resolved if critical theory is to be revitalized as heir to the 
left-Hegelian tradition in keeping with the demands of the time. These demands are 
both of an external societal kind, namely the prevalence of social pathologies of 
various sorts, and of an internal theoretical kind, namely critical theory’s inadequacies 
and resultant failure to diagnose and explain the persistent social pathologies. Given 
Honneth’s position in the critical theory tradition, the leading member of the third 
generation, the task of dealing with the challenges consists of designing an approach 
that would be able to correct the weaknesses of the second generation and go beyond 
its achievements. The problem to be resolved thus implicates Habermas and, in 
particular, his assignment of too much weight – as Honneth sees it – to the cognitive 
dimension. 
Having replaced the productivist by the communication paradigm for the 
purposes of which he then developed universal pragmatics, Habermas came to 
emphasize the centrality of linguistic rules in a way that refocused critical theory on 
whatever restrictions are imposed on the application of those rules. Since 
emancipation thus became dependent on the process of communicative rationalization 
and since this is a high-level process which transpires above the heads and behind the 
backs of social actors, however, critical theory in its new guise was rendered 
incapable not only of linking up with the moral experience of the members of society, 
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but by the same token also of diagnosing social pathologies. Honneth’s response was 
not, as might have been expected, to abandon the communication paradigm, but rather 
to give it a different interpretation. Instead of linguistic rules, ‘moral experience’  is 
emphasized, and instead of impediments put in the way of the use of such rules in 
communication, instances of ‘disrespect’ in the sense of the ‘violation of identity 
claims’ acquired in the process of socialization now called for attention (2007a: 70, 
71). This reorientation meant that genuine social pathologies which arise from the 
deformation of the conditions of reciprocal recognition in the intimate, legal and work 
spheres were moved centre stage. The core of Honneth’s criticism of Habermas and 
more generally of the Frankfurt tradition of critical theory, however, rested on the 
place and role of the cognitive dimension. Considering the critical theorists’ appeal to 
instrumental rationality, purposive rationality or functionalist in the sense of 
organizational rationality, Honneth regards critical theory from Horkheimer and 
Adorno to Habermas as evidently having proceeded by developing critiques of the 
disorder of modern society in principle in terms of the level of rationality attained at a 
particular stage. Deformations such as the totally administered society or the 
colonization of the lifeworld, for instance, could be identified only with reference to 
the level of development of capitalism or of the system. For Honneth, this procedure 
is tantamount to ‘a rational-theoretic narrowing of social critique’ (2007a: 73) and, by 
implication, simultaneously a cognitivist narrowing, since he treats the cognitive and 
rationality as being equivalent. In this vein, he writes: ‘…only those anomalies which 
occur in human beings’ cognitive dimensions can be regarded as deviations from the 
ideal’ (2007a: 73) and therefore figure as legitimate objects of critique.  
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The obvious conclusion to be drawn here is that Honneth in his inaugural 
address, as in his earlier work, operates with a narrow, traditional concept of the 
cognitive which is not borne out by developments since the cognitive revolution. His 
conception of the cognitive betrays that he remains under the spell and being caught 
up in the representational view based on the assumption of the logical vocabulary of 
subject and object, the internal and the external, rather than grasping the opportunity 
opened by recent developments of conceiving of cognition as the embodied mind in 
action (Varela, Thompson and Rosch 1997) which significantly relativizes the 
traditional mode of thinking. What I understand from these recent developments, 
among other things, is that a possibility has arisen to go beyond both Habermas and 
Honneth. The first important fact is that they have in common the communication 
paradigm. The second important fact is that they differ from each other in that they 
stress distinct dimensions of communication – the one public political communication 
serving as the medium of democratic value- and will-formation, the other social in the 
sense of lifeworld and civil society communication in the medium of which identify 
formation takes place. The further unquestionable and vital fact that these two forms 
of communication are not and cannot be conceived as being completely independent 
and therefore isolated from one another, gives rise to an interesting and theoretically 
most important question: what mediates between the two forms of communication 
respectively favoured by Habermas and Honneth, or what makes it possible for them 
to become interrelated?  In the wake of one of the most important, if not the most 
important, intellectual developments of our time, the answer to this question in my 
considered view has to be sought in embodied cognitive competences and cognitive 
forms of different levels and scope13 which by no means admit of being summarily 
 22 
Published in Philosophy and Social Criticism 38(6), 2012, pp. 591-607. 
 
reduced to consciousness, rationality, emotional emptiness and so forth and, on that 
basis, exiled to the margins. 
Returning finally to the Tanner Lectures, we can afford to be brief. Already 
having reviewed both Honneth’s conception and use of the cognitive in his laudable 
project to recover the concept of reification for contemporary critical theory, there can 
be no doubt about the fact that his position in these Lectures is essentially in line with 
its development from the early work through his inaugural address. Here we have the 
same concept of the cognitive which in a currently indefensibly narrow, traditional 
manner is equated with consciousness, purposive rationality, explicit knowledge, all 
devoid of both normative and emotional-motivational structure, content and 
significance. But there is also more specific indications of the inadequate treatment of 
the cognitive in these Lectures. Superficial indications of a lingering problem are to 
be found in Honneth’s use of such concepts as attention, forgetfulness and memory. 
Reification is said to be a kind of ‘reduced attentiveness’ (59) or a kind of 
‘forgetfulness of recognition’ (56) which is born by an ‘ensemble of habits and 
attitudes’ (26), while recognition involves ‘the memory of an antecedent act’ (57). 
Now, it does not take an expert in cognitive science to see that every one of these is in 
fact a cognitive concept. It of course by no means detracts from reification to 
conceive it in cognitive terms as lack of attentiveness or forgetfulness and a set of 
cognitive schemata – on the contrary. Besides the substantive examples of reification 
he discusses (59-60, 155-58), a particular figure of thought Honneth employs on 
numerous occasions in the Lectures to specify analytically what reification amounts to 
bears out the plausibility of his proposal to regard reification as forgetfulness. 
According to it, reification is neither a matter of a mere cognitive error, nor one of an 
injustice in the sense of the infringement of a moral norm, but rather a simplification 
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of a more of less complex set of practice-based relations which leads to delusion (21-
2, 25, 52-3, 56, 59) – for instance, modern forms of slavery and genocide. It is equally 
plausible to approach recognition in terms of memory. The thrust of the argument in 
this article is that recognition is more properly conceived in contemporary cognitive 
terms. The fact that Honneth links recognition to memory, a cognitive concept, must 
raise a problem for him, however, considering his studiously maintained distinctions. 
What we in fact witness here is Honneth’s completion of the gerrymandering act in 
which he engages in respect of the cognitive throughout the Tanner Lectures. 
Whereas he otherwise takes pains to draw a sharp distinction between the cognitive 
and recognition, here he falls back on assumptions which lead him to articulate his 
own position precisely in cognitive terms. 
            Aside from incidental indications, however, the problem of the cognitive is to 
be found at the very core of Honneth’s argument. In order to be able to restore the old 
concept of reification for use by contemporary critical theory, it is necessary for 
Honneth to establish the concept of recognition as the foil against which reification 
can be showed up as distortion or deformation. From Lukács he critically draws the 
idea that reification is ‘a form of praxis that is structurally false’ (26), which 
conversely implies a ‘proper…genuine…true…non-reified’ (26, 28, 31) form of 
praxis or ‘undistorted human agency’ (27). Support for this interpretation is then 
sought in Heidegger’s concept of care which Honneth takes as referring to ‘that form 
of practical orientation that is especially characteristic of the structure of the human 
mode of existence’ (32). The question arising here is precisely what ‘structure’ (26, 
32) and ‘form’ (26, 31, 53) mean or refer to. Honneth on occasion also speaks of 
‘perspective’ (55). How should recognition as structure, form or perspective be 
conceived? Honneth indeed gives a number of indications, yet it is remarkable that 
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they consistently point to something that does not and cannot provide a basis for 
drawing a sharp line between recognition and the cognitive. On the contrary, what he 
submits makes clear that we are here dealing with cognitive phenomena. Of structure 
he says that it refers to ‘an ensemble of habits and attitudes’ (26) or the ‘subject’s 
interpretative habits’ (33). And form he describes as ‘knowledge’ (56) or, more 
specifically, as ‘pre-reflective knowledge’ (33) which he renders yet more specific by 
speaking of ‘the genuine, involved human perspective’ (54). Taken together, this 
means that such an ensemble gives structure or form to the human mode of existence 
and praxis which serves as the medium of recognition in the sense of the practical 
orientation of empathetic engagement with the world. The structure or form makes 
available a pre-reflective kind of knowledge which comes into operation as a 
perspective in the course of engaging with the world. Once again it is plain to see that 
what is essentially at issue here is a range of concepts deriving directly from the 
cognitive tradition. A dynamic set of cognitive structures makes possible the 
establishment of a connection with the world, bringing into play pre-reflective know 
how and the bringing to bear of a perspective on the world. To be able to 
conceptualize recognition, Honneth is apparently compelled, despite his painstaking 
argumentation to the contrary, to have recourse precisely to an approach and a mode 
of thinking from which he seeks to distance himself.  
Recognition, to conclude, is itself a cognitive concept – as becomes clear 
when one takes the time to re-cognise the word, as it were. It stands to the cognitive 
as the metacognitive.14 According to Brinck and Liljenfors (2009: 17), the latter 
concerns human beings’ ability ‘to implicitly or explicitly access [their] own 
cognitive states, judgements in knowledge and learning, feelings of knowing, 
uncertainty monitoring, categorization, evaluation, decision-based action, etc.’  
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However, the thrust of re-cognition as the metacognitive competence or constant 
awareness, which is given with our embodiment, nervous system and cognitive 
equipment as the product of millions of years of physical, social and cultural 
development, comes into sharp focus when one considers the nature of the cognitive 
problematic as such, rather than cutting it in half as does Honneth. The cognitive 
problematic refers to the fact that something forming part of the world is able, 
nevertheless, to relate to the world in a way that allows it to take a perspective on the 
world and accordingly to act upon it, while having the capacity to remain aware of 
that relation, perspective and action as well as of their consequences. Re-cognition 
thus concerns the metacognitive awareness on the part of human beings that they not 
only are and remain an inherent part of the world, but that they as such participate in 
virtually every aspect of its development and evolution and, therefore, have a weighty 
responsibility on their shoulders.15
 




I dedicate this article to John Farrell, long-time translator of Axel Honneth, and 
student of mine in the early 1980s at UCC. 
 
1 My interest is in particular in the cognitive problem, an interest deriving from my 
own longstanding endeavour to revitalize critical theory. For recent windows on my 
cognitive theoretical approach, see note 13. 
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2 In the following, page numbers without any further bibliographical details refer to 
Honneth’s Tanner Lectures entitled Reification (2008). 
3 On the left-Hegelian tradition and the relation between critical theory and 
pragmatism, see Strydom (2011a). 
4 For his adoption of the three-place model, see the epistemological-methodological 
core of Lukács’ (1971: 152-56) book. 
5 See Adorno (1970) for evidence of the three-place model. 
6 The argument against foundationalism is supported by contemporary cognitive 
science’s investigation of intersubjectivity. At first sight, it indeed seems as though 
cognitive science supports Honneth’s idea of an elementary form of recognition. For 
instance, Armezzani, Callieri and Di Petta (2009) report – referring to a for me 
inaccessible Italian interview – that Varela studies empathy ‘as the essential form of 
our “being with others…the fact of being structurally conceived as having relations 
with our congeners, with individuals belonging to the same species”’ (2009: 52). Yet, 
while the role of embodiment and hence empathy is receiving a growing emphasis, it 
is nevertheless held that it involves both perception and inference (e.g. Thompson 
2001). A complex set of relations involving the process of mutual implication of 
different moments is thus recognized. 
7 It also gives rise to potentially misleading criticism. Honneth’s strictures against the 
‘cognitivist’ approach (49) make it seem as though Habermas not only excludes the 
opening moment of felt engagement with the quality of a situation, but is in principle 
unable to take it into account. On numerous occasions, however, Habermas dwells on 
its importance – e.g., discussing when a vague sense or feeling, such as 
‘uncertain[ty]’, is called forth by an ‘objective occasion’ which lends a situation a 
particular quality, such as a ‘problem’, ‘challenge’ or ‘threat’, thereby ‘opening up’ 
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the situation and affording those involved ‘privileged access’ to its structure (1987: 
400-03). 
8 The model makes a fourth appearance in Honneth’s presentation of the human ‘self-
relation’ in terms of three moments: (i) ‘we encounter our mental states for the most 
part as phenomena that befall us’; (ii) ‘there is something to which we give 
expression, or toward which we direct our attention’; (iii) ‘we are already familiar 
with our desires and feelings to a certain extent, because we have learned…’ (69-71). 
9 Methodological outlines are to be found in Honneth (2007a, 2004, 2007b). 
10 C Wright Mills, with both a pragmatist and critical theory education behind him, 
saw the sociological imagination as involving the following abductive pattern: making 
a creative, insightful, potentially fruitful and practically effective connection in a 
historically specific context among ‘personal troubles of milieu’, ‘public issues of 
social structure’ and ‘master symbols of legitimation’ (1970: 14, 46). 
11 Since abduction has virtually been displaced by the reductive mode of inference 
called ‘hypothesis’ in the course of the development of positivism, it should be 
carefully distinguished from hypothesis. Adorno criticized hypotheses since, being 
devoid of imagination, they are designed to establish regularities or what can be 
regularly expected, and: ‘What can merely be expected is itself a piece of societal 
activity, and is incommensurable with the goal of critique’ (1976: 69). 
12 See, for instance, Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1997) and Conein (2005). 
13 To mention just a few directly relevant references: Howard (1994), Clark (1998), 
Wertsch (1998), Ridgeway (2006), European Journal of Social Theory (2007), 
Carassa, Morganti and Riva (2009). Strydom (2006, 2007, 2009, 2011a, 2011b, 
2011c) contain indications of the direction in which critical theory is required to go on 
the path between and beyond Habermas and Honneth. Cognitive sociologically, it 
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articulates precisely what Honneth regards as the interrelation of ‘mechanisms of 
mutual recognition’ (2009) but leaves unanalyzed. 
14 Honneth refers to recognition plausibly as ‘nonepistemic’ (151), but implausibly as 
‘precognitive’ (152). For a critical theoretical application of the idea of 
metacognition, see Strydom (2011b). 
15 The presupposed distinction among the cognitive, the normative and the aesthetic – 
as they are traditionally called – which plays such a deeply structuring yet not 
reflected role in Honneth’s Tanner Lectures is in fact a cognitive figure of thought. It 
refers, on the one hand, to the embodied unconscious and conscious intellectual, 
moral and emotional-motivational capacities and competences of the human 
individual and, on the other, to the corresponding supporting cultural spheres and the  
structures and bodies of different kinds of knowledge they harbour. Rather than 
isolated components, however, these three are moments in an ongoing process of 
which those involved form a part and in which they participate. Honneth’s concept of 
‘existential involvement and sympathy (Anteilnahme)’ (150) – the German could be 
translated literally as taking part or participation – refers precisely to being part of and 
participating in this process by bringing the three moments into play in a way that 
allows their mutual implication. In these terms, metacognition is the constant 
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